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Theory of Mind (ToM) has received significant research attention. Traditional ToM
research has provided important understanding of how humans reason about mental
states by utilizing shared world knowledge, social cues, and the interpretation of
actions; however, many current behavioral paradigms are limited to static, “third-person”
protocols. Emerging experimental approaches such as cognitive simulation and simulated
social interaction offer opportunities to investigate ToM in interactive, “first-person” and
“second-person” scenarios while affording greater experimental control. The advantages
and limitations of traditional and emerging ToM methodologies are discussed with the
intent of advancing the understanding of ToM in socially mediated situations.
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INTRODUCTION
Every day, humans engage in a wide variety of social interactions
to achieve a diverse set of social goals that include acquiring infor-
mation, influencing a partner’s behavior through, and maintain-
ing emotional intimacy through sharing thoughts and feelings.
Integral to an individual’s success in these social encounters is
his or her ability to reason about the thoughts, beliefs, and feel-
ings of others to predict behavioral responses. This ability has
been termed theory of mind (ToM; Premack and Woodruff, 1978;
Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
The social importance of ToM can be demonstrated by imagin-
ing social interaction without it. To demonstrate the difficulty of
explaining human behavior without ToM, Baron-Cohen (1997)
used the task of explaining the behavior of a man who walks
into a room, looks around, and then simply exits the room.
Plausible mentalistic explanations can be easily generated for this
scenario (e.g., the man forgot why he entered the room, the man
was looking for something in the room and discovered it was
not there); however, developing plausible non-mentalistic expla-
nations of the man’s behavior is more difficult (Baron-Cohen,
1997). The difficulties in generating concise and probable non-
mentalistic explanations for this set of simple behaviors illustrate,
on a small scale, the confusion that might result from complex
behaviors like deception, persuasion, or flirting in the absence of
ToM. Indeed, recognition of ToM’s importance for social func-
tioning has sparked extensive research in clinical populations for
whom challenges in social interaction are common, including
individuals with autism spectrum disorders (Perner et al., 1989;
Happé, 1994; Baron-Cohen et al., 1995, 1999, 2001; Hill, 2004;
Losh et al., 2012), schizophrenia (Corcoran et al., 1995; Brüne
et al., 2007; Champagne-Lavau and Stip, 2010; Couture et al.,
2011; Hooker et al., 2011), and traumatic brain injury (Bibby
and McDonald, 2005; Havet-Thomassin et al., 2006; Henry et al.,
2006; Milders, 2006; Muller et al., 2010; Turkstra et al., 2004;
Turkstra, 2008).
Given the importance of ToM in daily interactions and the
prevalence of ToM deficits in some clinical populations, it is
important for researchers to critically consider both the concept
of ToM as well as tasks used to investigate it. Accordingly, the
goals of this article are to (1) present a framework of mecha-
nisms that allow humans to infer and reason about mental states
in social interaction, (2) review the benefits and limitations of
current behavioral tasks designed to test each mechanism, and
(3) discuss potential new directions for studying and under-
standing ToM, with consideration of both the advantages and
the limitations that these approaches offer over more traditional
techniques. It is our position that the knowledge to be gained
from the incorporation of these new methodologies may advance
not only the understanding of how humans reason about the
mental states of others, but may also further sciences devoted
to improving or compensating for ToM impairments and artifi-
cial intelligence research that is focused on developing artificial
models of human-like social processes.
MECHANISMS OF ToM
Since ToM research has been broad in terms of the interested dis-
ciplines, target populations and testing methodologies used, it is
important to critically consider the concept of ToM, especially
the ways in which our conceptualizations influence the course
of ToM research. Developing a “working definition” of ToM will
help guide research on not only the underlying network of skills
that facilitate ToM, butmay also provide insight into where break-
downs in ToMmay occur. To begin forming such a definition, we
posed the question, “How do humans accurately infer the men-
tal states of others?” From this consideration, three components
of interaction emerged as clues to ToM: (1) knowledge of the
shared context, (2) perception of social cues, and (3) interpreta-
tions of actions, (See Table 1 and Figure 1). These components,
and the experimental tasks developed to assess each, are reviewed
below.
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Table 1 | A summary of tasks used to test key mechanisms of Theory of Mind.
Mechanism Type of task Example task Findings
Shared world knowledge Text-based tasks Strange stories (Happé, 1994) Individuals with autism have more trouble
explaining the strange stories using mentalistic
explanations than their peers without autism and
those with mental disability (Happé, 1994; White
et al., 2009).
Non-verbal picture-based tasks Character intention task (Sarfati
et al., 1997)
Adults with TBI and schizophrenia are less accurate
at choosing appropriate endings to comic strip
stories where mental state attribution is needed
(Sarfati et al., 1997; Havet-Thomassin et al., 2006)
Perceiving social cues Facial emotion recognition Reading the mind in the eyes task
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)
Adults with TBI and autism have more trouble
identifying mental states based on facial affect
displays (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001;
Havet-Thomassin et al., 2006; Turkstra, 2008).
Facial/Vocal emotion recognition The awareness of social inference
test (TASIT; McDonald et al.,
2006)
Adults with TBI and schizophrenia are less accurate
at identifying facial emotions than healthy,
uninjured peers (McDonald et al., 2006; Sparks
et al., 2010).
Interpreting actions False belief tasks Reality unknown false belief
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983)
Typically developing children begin to pass reality
unknown false belief tasks around the age of 4
years (Wimmer and Perner, 1983); however,
children with autism may fail to pass this task
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
False belief tasks Appearance reality false belief
(Flavell et al., 1983)
Typically developing children begin to succeed on
appearance reality tasks more frequently around
the age of 4-years (Carlson et al., 2004).
False belief tasks Second-order false belief (Perner
and Wimmer, 1985)
Typically developing children develop some
competence in 2nd order false belief tasks
between the ages of 6- and 7-years.
SHAREDWORLD KNOWLEDGE
ToM, as one manifestation of cognition, is situated in the context
of the surrounding world (Wilson, 2002). Consider, for exam-
ple, the ToM demands implicit in a typical conversation. During
a conversation, individuals must quickly infer their partners’
thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and goals in order to formulate an
appropriate response. As with other forms of joint action, making
appropriate responses in conversation also requires the integra-
tion of cues from the conversational partner and the context,
including prior world knowledge (e.g., amount of personal space
with which a partner might be comfortable), knowledge about
the relationship between individuals (e.g., how much disclosure
is appropriate with a close friend vs. a co-worker), the goal of
the interaction (e.g., what information is required to complete
a joint task), and the conditions under which the conversation
will occur (e.g., in a group setting) to make quick, on-line guesses
about a partners’ mental states (for review see Sebanz et al., 2006;
Knoblich et al., 2011).
To investigate how shared world knowledge might facili-
tate ToM, researchers commonly present participants with short
descriptions or picture sets of social scenarios and then ask par-
ticipants to infer the mental states of characters or to predict
characters’ behaviors based on these inferred mental states
(Happé, 1994; Havet-Thomassin et al., 2006). Happé’s Strange
Stories Task (1994) is one example of this type of task. The Strange
Stories Task tests the ability to use prior world knowledge in order
to understand several communication acts embedded in story
situations, including faux pas, persuasion, pretending, and decep-
tion, and to accurately select the intended story interpretation.
Tasks like the Strange Stories Task, designed to assess an ability
to reason about mental states through integration of shared world
knowledge, are valuable in that they have been found to detect
ToM deficits in both individuals with autism spectrum disor-
ders and traumatic brain injury (Happé, 1994; Havet-Thomassin
et al., 2006). However, it is important to consider that these tasks
impose considerable cognitive demands while testing ToM, espe-
cially demands on working memory and, in the case of verbal
or text-based tasks, linguistic processing. For example, in inter-
preting a story describing a scenario in which a character tells
a white lie, participants must process the language of the story
and hold the relevant information in working memory while that
information is integrated with prior knowledge and an inter-
pretation is selected. These demands become especially critical
when investigating ToM of individuals who may have language
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FIGURE 1 | A storyboard of the Sally-Ann or Location False Belief Task
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983) used to test attribution of mental states to
others in children.
disorders or deficits in working memory. Further, many of these
tasks are passive and reflective in nature (e.g., Happé, 1994;
Brüne et al., 2007), which may overestimate ToM ability in daily
life. For example, tasks requiring individuals to make mental
state inferences from described scenarios generally allow ample
response time and do not typically require individuals to for-
mulate appropriate responses as if they themselves were in the
situation.
PERCEIVING SOCIAL CUES
Another way in which humans infer the mental states of others
is through the perception of various social cues. Though men-
tal states are inherently cognitive phenomena, humans have a
sophisticated repertoire of behaviors, including gaze cues, facial
expressions, and vocal cues, through which they express their
mental states.
The perception of gaze cues as a method in which humans
infer mental states is one of the most studied mechanisms of
ToM. Gaze cues signal the basic direction or object of one’s
attention (Bayliss et al., 2007; Frischen et al., 2007), and by fol-
lowing a partner’s gaze, an individual is able to infer his or
her partner’s intentions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995). An individ-
ual’s ability to use gaze-based cues to infer the knowledge of
others develops in childhood, and these cues have been found
to outweigh deceptive verbal cues in experimental paradigms
(Freire et al., 2004). Additionally, gaze cues in conversation allow
an individual to monitor understanding of his or her message
(Clark and Krych, 2004) and also to signal a desire for partner
feedback or to surrender the speaking floor, (Kendon, 1967;
Duncan, 1972; Bavelas et al., 2002). Further, speaker gaze cues
may work to resolve linguistic ambiguities in non-literal language
like sarcasm, as Williams et al. (2009) reported. For example,
in Western cultures speakers tend to look away from their part-
ners while making sarcastic comments, signaling that the speaker
does not actually believe what he or she is saying (Williams et al.,
2009).
Emotion recognition likewise has received much research
attention as, like gaze cues, facial, and vocal emotional cues are
valuable in the inference of mental states (De Sonneville et al.,
2002). Typically, humans develop the ability to discriminate and
perceive changes in facial expressions very early in life; however,
the speed and accuracy with which children identify and match
facial emotions continues to develop into adulthood (Barrera and
Maurer, 1981; McClure, 2000). Both children and adults are gen-
erally quicker and more accurate in their identification of positive
emotions like “happy” as compared to negative emotions like
“sad” (De Sonneville et al., 2002). Humans also convey emotional
content in aspects of vocal production including vocal intensity,
prosody, quality, and speech rate.
Several tasks exist to study both gaze behavior and emo-
tion recognition. Much has been learned about gaze behavior
through the observation of dyadic interactions (e.g., Duncan,
1972; Clark and Krych, 2004) as well as through experimen-
tal manipulation of gaze cues (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Bayliss
and Tipper, 2006). In a standard gaze perception task, indi-
viduals are shown a face with the eyes either oriented straight
ahead or shifted in one direction. From these images, participants
are asked to make inferences about the characters’ intentions or
mental states (Frischen et al., 2007). Similar tasks have been devel-
oped to assess comprehension of facial emotion (Ekman and
Friesen, 1976). In one example, De Sonneville et al. (2002) pre-
sented participants with four faces, each of which portrayed a
different emotion, and asked participants to determine whether
or not a target emotion was demonstrated in one of the four
foils. These authors also used a matching emotion recogni-
tion task, in which participants decided if two faces showed
the same or different emotions (De Sonneville et al., 2002).
Another method used to evaluate emotion recognition is to deter-
mine how accurately participants identify emotions from facial
expressions with varying levels of subtlety. Thomas et al. (2007)
employed a task in which participants viewed photographs of
people portraying different degrees of various emotions, from
very subtle anger to very obvious happiness, to detect the accu-
racy of participant emotion recognition. Vocal emotion recogni-
tion can also be evaluated with tasks similar to those designed
to measure facial emotion. In these tasks, participants gener-
ally hear semantically neutral sentences with different forms of
emotional prosody and are asked to identify the emotion of
the speaker (Nowicki and Carton, 1993; Scherer and Scherer,
2011).
Like tasks requiring the use of shared world knowledge for
ToM reasoning, social cue perception tasks have greatly con-
tributed to what is understood about mental state reasoning.
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These tasks too, however, share limitations in their reflec-
tive, offline design, and limited ecological validity. Considering
emotion recognition tasks, for example, participants are often
presented with decontextualized images of faces (e.g., Bowers
et al., 1999; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and are asked to either
identify the emotion or tomatch it to a target (De Sonneville et al.,
2002; Thomas et al., 2007). Additionally, even when stimuli are
dynamic in the form of video clips (McDonald et al., 2006), par-
ticipants are still given time to observe the stimulus, consider its
properties, andmake a judgment. In daily life, emotional displays,
are fleeting but are rarely presented in isolation—redundant clues
to mental states are presented in partners’ words, faces, voices,
and actions. This combination of presenting isolated social cues,
which may underestimate actual abilities, and prolonged obser-
vation and thinking time, which may overestimate abilities, make
it difficult to establish an accurate picture of the perception of
social cues in everyday interaction. These limitations are of clin-
ical importance because the ability to infer mental states from
social cues has been commonly studied as a means to better
understand the impact of social deficits on functioning in every-
day life (Spell and Frank, 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Croker
and McDonald, 2005; Tonks et al., 2007; Turkstra, 2008; Zupan
et al., 2009).
INTERPRETATION OF ACTIONS
Research on the development of ToM has provided evidence that
children as young as 6 months of age form expectations regarding
how humans interact with other humans and inanimate objects
(Legerstee et al., 2000). As humans, we generally believe that oth-
ers act in ways that are consistent with their beliefs and goals
(Heider and Simmel, 1944; Ajzen, 1991). Given this assumption,
passively observing behavior can offer important clues regarding
the intentions or beliefs of others. Several tasks have been devel-
oped to evaluate participants’ abilities to infer mental states from
behavior (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). For example, in a standard
false-belief task (e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983), participants
infer a character’s belief based on the observations of her actions.
Tasks requiring the interpretation of actions are frequently
used in developmental literature (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Luo,
2011; Scott et al., 2012), but studies of joint action have also
provided insight into how humans interpret actions to infer
the mental states of others (for review see Sebanz et al., 2006;
Knoblich et al., 2011). For example, Sebanz et al. (2006) sug-
gest that using gaze cues to infer what someone is attending to,
as well as knowing what task the person is engaged in, helps
observers to predict others’ action goals. Supporting the rela-
tionship between observing actions and inferring mental states,
Ramnani and Miall (2004) trained participants to perform a
button-press task in response to visual symbols, with the symbol
color indicating whether the participant, a partner, or the com-
puter should respond. Neuroimaging data from this experiment
suggested that predicting another’s actions (i.e., predicting when
a partner should act) activated neural regions important for ToM
(Ramnani and Miall, 2004).
While tasks designed to test ToM through the observation of
actions are inherently passive in nature, joint action tasks, like that
used by Ramnani and Miall, have allowed for the study of ToM
abilities in simulated interactions as opposed to simply reasoning
about social scenarios as third-party observers.
EMERGING TOOLS ANDMETHODS TO STUDY ToM
The mechanisms discussed above allow individuals to draw on
information about the actions, behaviors, and knowledge of oth-
ers to make inferences about their thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and
intentions. Individuals gather this information through recipro-
cal interactions and process it on-line to make ToM inferences
and determine subsequent behavior. To study this interactive,
on-line social-cognitive process, research on ToM has primarily
used experimental paradigms that involve participants making
ToM inferences from stimuli presented as static images (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001; De Sonneville et al., 2002; Mutlu et al.,
2009), textual stories (Happé et al., 1998), or video vignettes
(Turkstra, 2008) that provide an observation-based, reflective
“third-person” understanding of ToM (Frith and Frith, 2006;
Schilbach et al., 2012). Schilbach et al. (2012) argue that ToM—
and social cognition in general—has fundamentally different
motivational consequences andunderlying neural processes when
individuals are socially and emotionally engaged with others than
when they are third-person observers. Interacting with others
provides individuals with the ability to perform active conver-
sational roles, which might include initiating or responding to
episodes of interaction, rather than observing the interaction as
a bystander. This active involvement also facilitates shared goals,
intentions, and actions among the participants of the interac-
tion, providing individuals with the ability to draw on firsthand
experience in making ToM inferences.
Recent research has highlighted the limitations of experimen-
tal methods that provide “third-person” evaluations of social
phenomena and has proposed a “second-person” approach to
studying social cognition (Wilms et al., 2010; Duff et al., 2012;
Risko et al., 2012; Schilbach et al., 2012). Risko et al. (2012)
suggested that experimental paradigms designed to study social
cognition form a continuum between simple, static representa-
tions of socially relevant stimuli and actual live social interac-
tion or between “reel” and “real” instances of interaction. This
continuum includes static schematic faces, dynamic schematic
faces, static photographs of faces, static photographs of people
in complex social scenes, dynamic images of people in com-
plex social scenes, situations with the potential for real social
interaction, and real social interactions. Studies that compare
responses to stimuli from different sections of this continuum
show significant differences. For instance, imaging studies show
that direct gaze elicits significantly greater brain response than
either gaze aversion or no gaze, but only when participants
observe live stimuli and not when they observe static images
(Ponkanen et al., 2010). Similarly, while the propensity to look
toward another individual’s eyes exists across the spectrum from
schematic faces to dynamic social scenes, potential for actual
social interaction significantly affects this propensity (Risko et al.,
2012). These results highlight key limitations in the use of exist-
ing “third-person” paradigms in the study of ToM mechanisms
and motivate the use of alternative approaches that afford study-
ing “first-person” or “second-person” social cognition in “real”
experimental paradigms.
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FIGURE 2 | Illustrations of three simulated experimental paradigms: (1) immersive virtual environments, (2) physical environment with a virtually
simulated character, and (3) physical environment with a humanlike robot.
FIRST- AND SECOND-PERSON APPROACHES TO STUDYING ToM
An emerging approach that seeks to build a first- or second-
person understanding of ToM mechanisms and processes is the
use of simulation-based computational methods such simulated
social interaction (Blascovich et al., 2002) and cognitive simula-
tion (Scassellati, 2002). These methods draw on advancements
in computer sciences to employ complex computational systems
that enable the simulation of embodied, situated interactions
and thus the development of protocols with great experimental
control and ecological validity.
Simulated social interaction
Simulated social interaction involves generating social behavior
in artificial agents such as virtual characters, which are often
embedded in immersive virtual environments or as humanlike
robots. Simulated social interaction offers greater experimental
control and ecological validity than do traditional “reel” exper-
imental paradigms (Loomis et al., 1999; Blascovich et al., 2002;
MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; Mutlu et al., 2009; Wilms et al.,
2010). In these experimental paradigms, participants interact
with simulated others whose behaviors are precisely controlled to
reflect experimental manipulations and who respond to changes
in the participants’ behaviors affording interactions that more
closely resemble real-world interactions than static simuli do.
These interactions might take place in immersive virtual envi-
ronments, in the physical environment with a virtually simulated
character (Pelphrey and Carter, 2008; Wilms et al., 2010), or in
the physical environment with a humanlike robot (MacDorman
and Ishiguro, 2006; Mutlu et al., 2009) (Figure 2).
Simulated social interaction offers a number of advantages
over traditional experimental paradigms used for the study of
ToM including precise control of experimental stimuli, inter-
active, dynamic social interaction, on-line processing and mea-
surement. Thus, these methods more closely approximate the
ToM demands of everyday interactions. Simulations of social
stimuli follow computational representations of human behav-
ior, which provide the experimenter with control parameters for
the behavior or mechanism under study and the ability to create
FIGURE 3 | The two types of gaze behaviors designed as experimental
stimuli: referential (left) and affiliative (right) (Andrist et al., 2012).
experimental manipulations that are impossible or infeasible for
human confederates to perform. In a recent study, Andrist et al.
(2012) developed a parametric model of gaze shifts and precisely
manipulated how much the head of a virtual character aligned
with its gaze target, creating two kinds of gaze shifts: affiliative
and referential. Affiliative gaze shifts involved the virtual character
aligning the head more toward the participant when it shifted its
gaze in the environment, while referential gaze shifts involved the
character aligning its gaze more with its gaze target (Figure 3).
The results showed that affiliative gaze increased subjective evalu-
ations of the character and the interaction, while referential gaze
increased recall of information from the environment (Andrist
et al., 2012).
The experimental paradigms involved in simulated social sit-
uations go beyond “presenting social stimuli,” but also offer
reciprocal social interaction. For instance, Wilms et al. (2010)
developed an experimental paradigm in which a virtual charac-
ter shifted its gaze jointly with the participant using real-time
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eye-tracking input. Their results showed that establishing joint
attention to an object of interest elicited greater activity in the
brain (medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex)
than did attending to the object non-jointly. The simulation
approach also affords on-line processing and measurement of
social interaction. For instance, another imaging study showed
that a virtual character elicited greater brain activation in the
superior temporal sulcus when it established mutual gaze with
participants than it did when it averted its gaze as it passed by
participants in the virtual world (Pelphrey et al., 2004), allowing
researchers to measure an on-line neural response that could be
captured by reflective approaches.
The precise control, interactivity, and on-line processing
afforded by this experimental approach offer greater ecological
validity for the study of ToM and social cognition. In a study that
embodies these characteristics, Mutlu et al. (2009) explored how
leakage cues—non-verbal cues that individuals give off on their
thoughts, beliefs, and intentions—presented by a robot might
elicit ToM inferences in participants. Participants played a ver-
sion of the 20-Questions guessing game with a humanlike robot
in which the robot covertly picked one of the items that were laid
on a table and the participants tried to guess which item the robot
picked by asking questions that the robot could only answer with
“Yes” and “No” (Figure 4). In half of the trials, the robot pro-
duced a brief gaze shift toward the item before answering the
questions, producing a leakage cue, while it did not shift its gaze
in the other half. Participants were able to identify the robot’s pick
with fewer questions and in shorter time when the robot pro-
duced leakage cues than they did when the robot did not leak
information, suggesting that the participants used the socially rel-
evant information tomake ToM inferences and tomore effectively
FIGURE 4 | Participants interacting with two humanlike robots in an
interactive protocol designed to study how individuals might use
nonverbal leakage to make ToM inferences (Mutlu et al., 2009).
narrow down the response options. Furthermore, the majority
of participants did not report noticing leakage cues or using this
information in the task, suggesting an implicit processing of such
cues. This experimental paradigm offers the ability to precisely
control the gaze cues presented by the robot, present these stimuli
in an interactive, dynamic protocol, and support on-line pro-
cessing toward shaping subsequent behavior in the interaction.
The experiment also contextualized ToM processes in a simu-
lated interaction that closely resembled face-to-face interaction
and captured effects of ToM processes on objective measures of
task performance.
Cognitive simulation
While simulated social interaction offers the ability to generate
precisely controlled social behaviors in artificial agents and to
create dynamic, interactive experimental scenarios, this approach
relies primarily on pre-scripted and experimenter-controlled
protocols—often referred to as Wizard-of-Oz studies (Dahlbäck
et al., 1993). This approach does not afford the study of ToM
processes in complex interactions such as joint action scenar-
ios (Sebanz et al., 2006) that require all parties to engage ToM
mechanisms in coordinating their actions toward a common
goal. A complementary approach to simulated social interac-
tion is cognitive simulation, which seeks to develop artificial
representations of neurocognitive mechanisms such as imitation
and perception of self, simulate them in artificial agents such as
humanlike robots, and assess their functioning in enabling ToM
inferences in human-agent interactions (Breazeal and Scassellati,
2002; Scassellati, 2002; Michel et al., 2004).
Building on simulation theory (Gallese and Goldman, 1998),
cognitive simulation involves the robot establishing and main-
taining representations of the mental states of its human counter-
parts by tracking and matching their states with resonant states of
its own. These representations enable the robot to take the per-
spective of its human counterparts, make inferences about the
human’s goals, and learn from their actions. For instance, Trafton
et al. (2005) developed a cognitive simulation that enabled the
robot to simulate “alternative worlds” and assess propositions
about these worlds in order to make inferences about the perspec-
tive of its human counterparts. A similar approach by Breazeal
et al. (2006) involved the robot maintaining separate sets of
“beliefs” in its belief system for itself and for its human coun-
terparts. The separate sets of beliefs enabled the robot to identify
differences in its beliefs from those of its human counterparts in
order to plan actions that it might take or skills it might learn in
order to establish a shared set of beliefs.
Examples of the cognitive simulation approach also include
simulations of the motor-resonance mechanism (Blakemore and
Decety, 2001) for enabling ToM inferences in artificial agents.
These examples build on the finding that observing the actions
of others elicits automatic activation of motor representations
associated with these actions and enables predictions about
action consequences. For instance, Gray et al. (2005) devel-
oped a system in which the robot parsed the actions of its
human counterparts and matched them to actions in its own
repertoire in order to make inferences about the goals of the
participant. These inferences enabled the robot to perform
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task-level simulations and track the participant’s progress in the
task in order to anticipate the needs of its partner and offer
help. A model developed by Bicho et al. (2011) extended this
paradigm by including a mapping between observed actions
and complementary actions required to successfully complete
a task and enabled the robot to more effectively coordi-
nate its actions with those of its human counterparts in the
task.
The preceeding examples illustrate how cognitive simulation
might complement the simulated interaction approach for study-
ing ToM mechanisms by simulating ToM processes in artificial
agents. When coupled, the two approaches promise two key
methodological advances in the study of ToM. First, they help in
assessing existing neurocognitive models of ToM mechanisms by
computationally simulating them and observing system behav-
ior in interactive situations. Second, they enable empirical studies
to build new understanding of ToM processes in truly interac-
tive protocols in which all agents—human or artificial—involved
in the interaction employ ToM mechanisms. The coupling of
the two approaches extends the methodological advantages of
simulated social interaction by enabling not only on-line mea-
surement of responses to social stimuli but also on-the-fly pre-
cise control over simulated cognitive mechanisms and social
behaviors, thus affording even greater experimental control. The
truly interactive setting of the protocols enabled by the cou-
pling of these two approaches also improves their ecological
validity.
EXAMPLE PARADIGMS FOR STUDYING ToMMECHANISMS
Recent research across many fields of social, cognitive, and com-
putational sciences has developed first- and second-person exper-
imental methods to study ToM mechanisms with the goal of
gaining a better understanding of these mechanisms and design-
ing artificial agents that effectively interact with people. The
paragraphs below illustrate paradigms that study the three key
ToM mechanisms described earlier.
Shared world knowledge
In making ToM inferences, individuals draw on a shared world
knowledge to integrate information from various sources includ-
ing resources in the environment, knowledge about social norms,
the goals of the interaction, the relationship among interac-
tion partners, and the participation structure of the interac-
tion. Mumm and Mutlu (2011) investigated how the relation-
ship between a humanlike robot and participants affected the
participants’ preferences for interpersonal distance, creating a
“likable” or “unlikable” humanlike robot using verbal fram-
ing. Participants responded to the unlikable robot’s attempts at
increasing intimacy using mutual gaze by physically distancing
themselves from the robot (Figure 5), while they did not change
their proxemic behavior with a likable robot. The results suggest
that the experimental protocol successfully established differ-
ent relationships between the robot and the participant across
the two conditions, which in turn shaped their preferences for
interpersonal distance, enabling on-line processing of gaze stim-
uli and measurement of preferences for interpersonal distance
FIGURE 5 | Participants maintaining different amounts of distance
between themselves and an “unlikable” robot in response to the
robot’s attempts to increase intimacy by following or avoiding the
participants with its gaze (Mumm and Mutlu, 2011).
directly from the distance that the participants maintained with
the robot.
Another study by Mutlu et al. (2009) explored how a robot
might use gaze cues to signal participation structure in a three-
party conversation and how this structure shaped participants’
conversational behavior. There were three conditions, which dif-
fered according to the percent of time the robot gazed at each
of the two participants in that condition. In one condition,
the robot looked exclusively at one participant (the addressee),
signaling that the second participant had the role of over-
hearer. In the second condition, the robot looked mostly at the
addressee and occasionally at the second participant, indicating
a role of bystander. In the third condition, gaze was distributed
equally between the two participants, indicating that both were
addressees. The results from the study showed that the partic-
ipants conformed to the norms of their signaled roles in their
conversational behavior 97% of the time and rated their experi-
ence with the conversation and involvement in the group con-
sistently with their conversational roles (e.g., feeling excluded
in the overhearer condition). The simulated social interaction
approach enabled precise control of the robot’s gaze behav-
iors to signal specific participation structures and illustrated
how individuals integrate a perception of the robot’s behav-
ioral cues and their world knowledge, particularly the norms
associated with the participation structure of a conversation,
to make ToM inferences about the conversational intentions
of the robot and follow the norms associated with inferred
intentions.
Perception of social cues
ToM inferences are also informed by perceptions of social cues
such as gaze. The study byMutlu et al. (2009) illustrates how ToM
might be studied using simulated social interaction. Examples
of simulation-based protocols also include studies that explore
how the precise temporal and spatial congruency of such cues
might affect outcomes such as joint attention, information recall,
and task performance (Staudte and Crocker, 2011; Huang and
Mutlu, 2012). Staudte and Crocker (2009) developed a video-
based experimental paradigm in which a robot presented factual
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statements about objects in the environment such as “the sphere
is next to a pyramid” and the robot looked toward the refer-
enced objects (e.g., sphere and pyramid) 800–1000 milliseconds
before the object names were spoken. The study manipulated
the congruency between the robot’s linguistic and gaze refer-
ences and showed that participants confirmed the correctness
of the statements faster when the two references were congru-
ent. The simulation-based approach not only ensured that gaze
cues were presented with precise timings but also enabled the
presentation of incongruent cues in gaze and speech that is dif-
ficult to reliably produce by human confederates in an interactive
protocol.
Another study by Huang and Mutlu (2012) extended these
results by comparing congruent gaze and speech cues to tem-
porally incongruent cues by introducing a delay into the robot’s
gaze shifts such that they were produced 500—1000 milliseconds
after the onset of linguistic references. The study also contex-
tualized these comparisons in two realistic tasks. The first task
involved the robot recounting a story and referring—using lin-
guistic and gaze cues—to a set of props. In the second task,
the robot provided instructions to participants to complete a
sorting task, referring to objects to be sorted using linguistic
and gaze cues (Figure 6). The results from the study showed
that participants recalled the details of the story better in the
first task than the second task, and were faster at locating to-
be-sorted objects when the robot used congruent speech and
gaze cues than when cues were spatially or temporally incon-
gruent. In addition to extending the results obtained by Staudte
and Crocker (2009) to a physically situated paradigm, this study
demonstrated the role of temporal congruency in ToM pro-
cesses. The study also illustrated the effects of perception of
FIGURE 6 | The robot is using gaze cues to establish joint attention
with the participants in a storytelling task (top) and a sorting task
(bottom) (Huang and Mutlu, 2012).
social cues on the outcomes of ToM processes such as infor-
mation recall and task performance in joint action. When the
robot used congruent gaze cues, participants established stronger
associations between objects in the environment and verbal infor-
mation presented by the robot, thereby showing improved task
performance.
Interpretation of actions
Mechanisms such as action observation (Knoblich et al., 2011)
also facilitate ToM processes by establishing a “procedural
common ground” between interaction partners (Clark, 1996).
Paradigms developed to study this mechanism most commonly
follow the cognitive simulation approach (e.g., Trafton et al.,
2005; Breazeal et al., 2006) or employ a coupling of the simulated
social interaction and cognitive simulation (e.g., Gray et al., 2005;
Bicho et al., 2011). A recent study used a paradigm in which a
robot provided participants with instructions on how to assemble
a structure and, by observing the participant’s actions, main-
tained an internal model of the participants’ progress, specifi-
cally modeling potential breakdowns in the participant’s under-
standing or execution of the instructions (Mutlu et al., 2013)
(Figure 7). When the robot inferredmisunderstandings or confu-
sion from its observations of participant actions or lack thereof, it
offered clarifications on the actions that the participant must take
to successfully progress in the task using conversational repair
strategies (Clark, 1994). Compared to the robot only provid-
ing instructions, the robot that made ToM inferences through
action observation and offered clarifications based on these infer-
ences received fewer requests for help from the participants when
breakdowns occurred. This protocol illustrates how the cog-
nitive simulation and simulated social interaction approaches
might be combined to create truly interactive experimental
paradigms in which participants and artificial agents employ ToM
mechanisms. Cognitive simulation enabled the robot to use its
observations of participant actions to infer misunderstandings
and confusions and to plan appropriate actions to offer clari-
fications. The simulated social interaction approach established
FIGURE 7 | The robot combines cognitive simulation and simulated
social behaviors to maintain a model of the participant’s progress in
the task using action observation and to provide feedback using
conversational repair (Mutlu et al., 2013).
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communication between the participant and the robot and
enabled the robot to use conversational strategies to execute its
plan to offer clarifications.
LIMITATIONS OF COMPUTATIONAL PARADIGMS
Simulation-based approaches offer unprecedented methodologi-
cal advantages for studying social cognition and ToM processes in
particular. They offer greater experimental control, on-line pro-
cessing of stimuli, a richer set of measures for ToM outcomes,
and truly interactive experimental scenarios, enabling the study
of complex interactions and affording more ecologically valid
research. These approaches, however, build on a number of
assumptions and are affected by a number of factors that limit
their promise.
Differences in simulated and real interactions
A key assumption that the simulation-based approaches dis-
cussed above make is that simulations match “real” stimuli and
that interactions with artificial agents are equivalent to inter-
actions with humans. While theoretical accounts such as the
mindlessness hypothesis (Langer, 1992; Nass and Moon, 2000)
and the findings presented above suggest that simulated interac-
tions closely approximate human interactions, a critical exami-
nation of the differences between these forms of interactions is
essential.
Design of computational platforms
Another factor that might limit the generalizability of findings
obtained in simulated approaches is the design of the simula-
tion platform. For instance, the experimental protocol developed
by Mutlu et al. (2009) to study leakage gaze cues employed two
robot platforms to investigate whether the design of the specific
robot platform used in the study affected these inferences. The
results showed that leakage gaze cues elicited ToM inferences, thus
improving participant performance in guessing the robot’s pick,
when presented by a highly humanlike android but not when
presented by a robot with a stylized design that featured cartoon-
like features (although a trend in the data toward an effect was
present). This finding suggests that the physical design of the
robot platform might affect social cognition and ToM inferences
with artificial agents and that different designs might vary in the
extent to which they activate ToM mechanisms. While the choice
of experimental materials and the design of experimental stimuli
has been found to affect social cognition in conventional exper-
imental paradigms, such as the attractiveness of faces shown in
stimuli interacting with gaze manipulations (Kampe et al., 2001),
a better understanding of how design features for artificial agents
affect social cognition and the development of benchmark plat-
forms for research in social cognition might help isolate such
effects.
Simplifications in simulations
Simulations of cognitive and behavioral mechanisms necessar-
ily involve simplifications in representation and presentation due
to difficulties in capturing the complexity of these mechanisms.
Such simplifications might result in artificial agents displaying
“robot-like” behaviors that fail in activating ToM mechanisms
or eliciting feelings of eeriness or discomfort—an effect often
referred to as the “uncanny valley” (Mori, 1970). Recent find-
ings indicate that exposure to artificial agents results in a shift in
what participants consider to be acceptable or preferred human
qualities (Chen et al., 2010), suggesting that properly acclimat-
ing participants to simulations might alleviate such effects or that
people might attune to simplified behaviors as artificial agents
become commonplace.
Individual differences
A final consideration in the use of simulation-based experimen-
tal paradigms is individual differences in responses to artificial
agents. Studies to date have identified individual differences based
on participant sex (Mutlu et al., 2006), cultural background
(Nomura et al., 2008), personality (Walters et al., 2008), and pet
ownership (Mutlu et al., 2009). While such differences might also
be observed in conventional experimental paradigms, whether
these differences predict those in simulation-based paradigms is
unknown. Simulation-based studies of ToM processes must con-
sider demographic and attitudinal factors to establish a better
understanding of their effects.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The study of ToM has provided much knowledge regarding
how the ability to reason about mental states develops in typ-
ical children and insight into impaired ToM in clinical pop-
ulations. The tasks developed through this research largely
measure individuals’ abilities to utilize and integrate informa-
tion from shared world knowledge, social cues, and physical
actions to infer the mental states of others to predict future
behavior. While the passive and reflective methods tradition-
ally used to study ToM have been invaluable to understand-
ing the mechanisms associated with the ability to infer mental
states, we, with others (Risko et al., 2012), argue that investi-
gations using interactive, on-line approaches to study ToM and
social cognition hold great promise to enrich the established
knowledge base. As described, emerging methods, including the
use of virtual and robotic platforms, provide opportunities to
study human behavior in social interactions while maintain-
ing experimental control. These emerging interactive and com-
putational methods may, in addition to extending knowledge
regarding ToM processing, enable the development of innovative,
technology-driven protocols for improving mentalizing in cases
of disorder.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank Dr. Lyn Turkstra and the anony-
mous reviewers for their valuable comments and feedback
on this manuscript. National Science Foundation awards IIS-
1017952, IIS-1149970, IIS-0121426, and ECS-0325383, JSPS
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S), KAKENHI (20220002),
and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., have provided support
for the research presented as examples of simulation-based
protocols. NIDCD T32DC005359 and NIDCD F31DC012481
to the University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of
Communication Sciences and Disorders have provided fellow-
ship support to the first author. The authors are also grateful for
support from the University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 413 | 9
Byom and Mutlu New directions in ToM
REFERENCES
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned
behavior. Organ. Behav. Hum.
Decis. Process. 50, 179–211. doi:
10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-T
Andrist, S., Tomislav, P., Mutlu, B.,
and Gleicher, M. (2012). “Designing
effective gazemechanisms for virtual
agents,” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI
Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems (CHI ’12)
(Austin, TX: ACM), 705–714.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1997). Mind-
blindness. Cambridge, MA; London:
The MIT Press.
Baron-Cohen, S., Campbell, R.,
Karmiloff-Smith, A., and Grant, J.
(1995). Are children with autism
blind to the mentalistic significance
of the eyes? Br. J. Dev. Psychol.
13, 379–398. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-
835X.1995.tb00687.x
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., and
Frith, U. (1985). Does the autis-
tic child have a ‘theory of mind’?
Cognition 21, 37–46.
Baron-Cohen, S., O’Riordan, M.,
Stone, V., Jones, R., and Plaisted,
K. (1999). Recognition of faux
pas by normally developing chil-
dren with asperger syndrome or
high-functioning autism. J. Autism
Dev. Disord. 29, 407–418. doi:
10.1023/A:1023035012436
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S.,
Hill, J., Raste, Y., and Plumb, I.
(2001). The ‘Reading the mind
in the eyes’ Test revised version:
a study with normal adults, and
adults with Asperger syndrome or
high-functioning autism. J. Child
Psychol. Psychiatry 42, 241–251. doi:
10.1111/1469-7610.00715
Barrera, M. E., and Maurer, D. (1981).
The perception of facial expressions
by the three-month-old. Child Dev.
52, 203–206. doi: 10.2307/1129231
Bavelas, J. B., Coates, L., and Johnson,
T. (2002). Listener responses as
a collaborative process: the role
of gaze. J. Commun. 52, 566–580.
doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2002.
tb02562.x
Bayliss, A. P., Frischen, A., Fenske,
M. J., and Tipper, S. P. (2007).
Affective evaluations of objects
are influenced by observed gaze
direction and emotional expres-
sion. Cognition 104, 644–653. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2006.07.012
Bayliss, A. P., and Tipper, S. P. (2006).
Predictive gaze cues and personality
judgments: should eye trust you?
Psychol. Sci. 17, 514–520.
Bibby, H., and McDonald, S. (2005).
Theory of mind after traumatic
brain injury. Neuropsychologia
43, 99–114. doi: 10.1016/
j.neuropsychologia.2004.04.027
Bicho, E., Erlhagen, W., Louro, L.,
and Costa e Silva, E. (2011).
Neuro-cognitive mechanisms of
decision making in joint action:
a human robot interaction study.
Hum. Mov. Sci. 30, 846–868. doi:
10.1016/j.humov.2010.08.012
Blakemore, S.-J., and Decety, J.
(2001). From the perception of
action to the understanding of
intention. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 2,
561–567.
Blascovich, J., Loomis, J., Beall, A. C.,
Swinth, K. R., Hoyt, C. L., and
Bailenson, J. N. (2002). Immersive
virtual environment technology as a
methodological tool for social psy-
chology. Psychol. Inq. 13, 103–124.
doi: 10.1207/S15327965PLI1302_01
Bowers, D., Blonder, L., Heilman, K.
M. (1999). Florida Affect Battery,
a Manual. Gailnsville, FL: Centre
for Neuropsychological Studies,
Cognitive Science laboratory.
Breazeal, C., Berlin, M., Brooks, A.,
Gray, J., and Thomaz, A. L. (2006).
Using perspective taking to learn
from ambiguous demonstrations.
Rob. Auton. Syst. 54, 385–393. doi:
10.1016/j.robot.2006.02.004
Breazeal, C., and Scassellati, B. (2002).
Robots that imitate humans.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 6, 481–487. doi:
10.1016/S1364-6613(02)02016-8
Brüne, M., Abdel-Hamid, M.,
Lehmkämper, C., and Sonntag,
C. (2007). Mental state attribu-
tion, neurocognitive functioning,
and psychopathology: what pre-
dicts poor social competence in
schizophrenia best? Schizophr. Res.
92, 151–159.
Carlson, S. M., Moses, L. J., and
Claxton, L. J. (2004). Individual
differences in executive functioning
and theory of mind: an investiga-
tion of inhibitory control and plan-
ning ability. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 87,
299–319. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2004.
01.002
Champagne-Lavau, M., and Stip, E.
(2010). Pragmatic and executive
dysfunction in schizophrenia.
J. Neurolinguist. 23, 285–296. doi:
10.1016/j.jneuroling.2009.08.009
Chen, H., Russell, R., Nakayama,
K., and Livingstone, M. (2010).
Crossing the uncanny valley:
adaptation to cartoon faces can
influence perception of human
faces. Perception 39, 378–386. doi:
10.1068/p6492
Clark, H. H. (1994). Managing prob-
lems in speaking. Speech Commun.
15, 243–250. doi: 10.1016/0167-
6393(94)90075-2
Clark, H. H. (1996). Using Language.
Cambridge: University Press. doi:
10.1017/CBO9780511620539
Clark, H. H., and Krych, M. A.
(2004). Speaking while monitoring
addressees for understanding.
J. Mem. Lang. 50, 62–81. doi:
10.1016/j.jml.2003.08.004
Corcoran, R., Mercer, G., and Frith, C.
(1995). Schizophrenia, symptoma-
tology and social influence: inves-
tigating ‘theory of mind’ in peo-
ple with schizophrenia. Schizophr.
Res. 17, 5–13. doi: 10.1016/0920-
9964(95)00024-G
Couture, S. M., Granholm, E. L.,
and Fish, S. C. (2011). A path
model investigation of neurocogni-
tion, theory of mind, social compe-
tence, negative symptoms and real-
world functioning in schizophrenia.
Schizophr. Res. 125, 152–160. doi:
10.1016/j.schres.2010.09.020
Croker, V., and McDonald, S. (2005).
Recognition of emotion from facial
expression following traumatic
brain injury. Brain Inj. 19, 787–799.
doi: 10.1080/02699050500110033
Dahlbäck, N., Jönsson, A., and
Ahrenberg, L. (1993). Wizard
of Oz studies—why and how.
Knowl. Based Syst. 6, 258–266. doi:
10.1016/0950-7051(93)90017-N
De Sonneville, L. M. J., Vershoor, C.
A., Njiokiktjien, C., Veld, V. H.
H. Toorenaar, N., and Vranken,
M. (2002). Facial identity and
facial emotions: speed, accuracy
and processing strategies in chil-
dren and adults. J. Clin. Exp.
Neuropsychol. 24, 200–213. doi:
10.1076/jcen.24.2.200.989
Duff, M. C., Mutlu, B., Byom, L. J.,
and Turkstra, L. S. (2012). Beyond
utterances: distributed cognition
as a framework for studying dis-
course in adults with acquired
brain injury. Semin. Speech Lang.
33, 44–54. doi: 10.1055/s-0031-
1301162
Duncan, S. (1972). Some signals and
rules for taking speaking turns in
conversations. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
23, 283–292. doi: 10.1037/h0033031
Ekman, P., and Friesen, W. (1976).
Pictures of Facial Affect. Palo Alto,
CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Flavell, J. H., Flavell, E. R., and
Green, F. L. (1983). Development
of the appearance-reality distinc-
tion. Cogn. Psychol. 15, 95–120. doi:
10.1016/0010-0285(83)90005-1
Freire, A., Eskritt, M., and Lee,
K. (2004). Are eyes windows
to a deceiver’s soul? children’s
use of another’s eye gaze cues
in a deceptive situation. Dev.
Psychol. 40, 1093–1104. doi:
10.1037/0012-1649.40.6.1093
Frischen, A., Bayliss, A. P., and Tipper,
S. P. (2007). Gaze cueing of
attention: visual attention, social
cognition, and individual differ-
ences. Psychol. Bull. 133, 694–724.
doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.133.4.694
Frischen, A., Smilek, D., Eastwood,
J. D., and Tipper, S. P. (2007).
Inhibition of return in response
to gaze cues: the roles of
time course and fixation cue.
Vis. Cogn. 15, 881–895. doi:
10.1080/13506280601112493
Frith, C. D., and Frith, U. (2006).
The neural basis of mentaliz-
ing. Neuron 50, 531–534. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2006.05.001
Gallese, V., and Goldman, A. (1998).
Mirror neurons and the simu-
lation theory of mind-reading.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 2, 493–501. doi:
10.1016/S1364-6613(98)01262-5
Gray, J., Breazeal, C., Berlin, M.,
Brooks, A., Lieberman, J. (2005).
“Action parsing and goal infer-
ence using self as simulator,”
in Proceedings of the 14th IEEE
International Workshop on
Robot and Human Interaction
Communication (Nashville, TN:
IEEE).
Happé, F. (1994). An advanced test of
theory of mind: understanding of
story characters’ thoughts and feel-
ings by able autistic, mentally hand-
icapped, and normal children and
adults. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 24,
129–154. doi: 10.1007/BF02172093
Happé, F., Winner, E., and Brownell, H.
(1998). The getting of wisdom: the-
ory of mind in old age. Dev. Psychol.
34, 358–362. doi: 10.1037/0012-
1649.34.2.358
Havet-Thomassin, V., Allain, P.,
Etcharry-Bouyx, F., and Le Gall, D.
(2006). What about theory of mind
after severe brain injury? Brain Inj.
20, 83–91.
Heider, F., and Simmel, M. (1944).
An experimental study of appar-
ent behavior. Am. J. Psychol. 57,
243–259. doi: 10.2307/1416950
Henry, J. D., Phillips, L. H., Crawford,
J. R., Ietswaar, M., and Summers, S.
(2006). Theory of mind following
traumatic brain injury: the role of
emotion recognition and executive
dysfunction. Neuropsychologia
44, 1623–1628. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2006.03.020
Hill, E. L. (2004). Evaluating the the-
ory of executive dysfunction in
autism. Dev. Rev. 24, 189–233. doi:
10.1016/j.dr.2004.01.001
Hooker, C. I., Bruce, L., Lincoln, S.
H., Fisher, M., and Vinogradov,
S. (2011). Theory of mind skills
are related to gray matter volume
in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex in schizophrenia. Biol.
Psychiatry 70, 1169–1178. doi:
10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.07.027
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 413 | 10
Byom and Mutlu New directions in ToM
Huang, C.-M., and Mutlu, B. (2012).
“Robot behavior toolkit: generat-
ing effective social behaviors for
robots,” in Proceedings of the 8th
ACM/IEEE International Conference
on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI
’12) (Boston, MA: ACM), 25–32.
Kampe, K. K. W., Frith, C., Dolan, R.
J., and Frith, U. (2001). Psychology:
reward value of attractiveness and
gaze. Nature 413, 589–589. doi:
10.1038/35098149
Kendon, A. (1967). Some functions
of gaze-direction in social interac-
tion. Acta Psychol. 26, 22–63. doi:
10.1016/0001-6918(67)90005-4
Knoblich, G., Butterfill, S., and Sebanz,
N. (2011). “Psychological research
on joint action: theory and data,”
in The Psychology of Learning
and Motivation, eds B. Ross
(Burlington, VT: Academic Press),
59–101.
Langer, E. J. (1992). Matters of
mind: mindfulness/mindlessness
in perspective. Conscious. Cogn.
1, 289–305. doi: 10.1016/1053-
8100(92)90066-J
Legerstee, M., Barna, J., and DiAdamo,
C. (2000). Precursors to the devel-
opment of intention at 6 months:
understanding people an their
actions. Dev. Psychol. 36, 627–634.
doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.36.5.627
Loomis, J., Blascovich, J., and Beall,
A. (1999). Immersive virtual envi-
ronment technology as a basic
research tool in psychology. Behav.
Res. Methods 31, 557–564. doi:
10.3758/BF03200735
Losh, M., Martin, G. E., Klusek, J.,
Hogan-Brown, A. L., and Sideris,
J. (2012). Social communica-
tion and theory of mind in boys
with autism and fragile X syn-
drome. Front. Psychol. 3:266. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00266
Luo, Y. (2011). Do 10-month-old
infants understand others’ false
beliefs? Cognition 121, 289–298.
MacDorman, K. F., and Ishiguro, H.
(2006). The uncanny advantage
of using androids in cogni-
tive and social science research.
Interact. Stud. 7, 297–337. doi:
10.1075/is.7.3.03mac
McClure, E. B. (2000). A meta-
analytic review of sex differences
in facial expression process-
ing and their development in
infants, children, and adolescents.
Psychol. Bull. 126, 424–453. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.126.3.424
McDonald, S., Bornhofen, C., Shum,
D., Long, E., Saunders, C., and
Neulinger, K. (2006). reliability
and validity of the awareness of
social inference test (TASIT): a
clinical test of social perception.
Disabil. Rehabil. 28, 1529–1542. doi:
10.1080/09638280600646185
Michel, P., Gold, K., and Scassellati,
B. (2004). “Motion-based robotic
self-recognition,” in Proceedings of
the 2004 IEEE/RSJ International
Conference on Intelligent Robots and
Systems (IROS ’04) (Sendai: IEEE).
Milders, M. C. D. (2006). Impairments
in theory of mind shortly
after traumatic brain injury
and at 1-year follow-up.
Nueropsychology 20, 400–408.
doi: 10.1037/0894-4105.20.4.400
Mori, M. (1970). The uncanny valley.
Energy 7, 33–35.
Muller, F., Simion, A., Reviriego, E.,
Galera, C. Mazaux, J. M., Barat, M.,
et al. (2010). Exploring theory of
mind after severe traumatic brain
injury. Cortex 46, 1088–1099. doi:
10.1016/j.cortex.2009.08.014
Mumm, J., and Mutlu, B. (2011).
“Human-robot proxemics: phys-
ical and psychological distancing
in human-robot interaction,” in
Proceedings of the 4th ACM/IEEE
International Conference on
Human-Robot Interaction (HRI ’11)
(Lausanne: ACM).
Mutlu, B., Forlizzi, J., and Hodgins, J.
(2006). “A storytelling robot: mod-
eling and evaluation of human-like
gaze behavior,” in Proceedings of the
6th IEEE International Conference on
Humanoid Robots (Genova: IEEE).
Mutlu, B., Shiwa, T., Kanda, T.,
Ishiguro, H., and Hagita, N. (2009).
“Footing in human-robot conver-
sations: how robots might shape
participant roles using gaze cues,”
in Proceedings of the 6th ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Human-
Robot Interaction (HRI ’09) (La Jolla,
CA: ACM).
Mutlu, B., Terrell, A., and Huang, C.-M.
(2013). “Coordination mechanisms
in human-robot collaboration,”





Mutlu, B., Yamaoka, F., Kanda, T.,
Ishiguro, H., and Hagita, N. (2009).
“Nonverbal Leakage in robots: com-
munication of intentions through
seemingly unintentional behavior,”
in Proceedings of the 6th ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Human-
Robot Interaction (HRI ’09) (La Jolla,
CA: ACM).
Nass, C., and Moon, Y. (2000).
Machines and mindlessness:
social responses to computers.
J. Soc. Issues 56, 81–103. doi:
10.1111/0022-4537.00153
Nomura, T., Suzuki, T., Kanda, T.,
Han, J., Hin, N., Burke, J., et al.
(2008). What people assume about
humanoid and animal-type robots:
cross-cultural analysis between
Japan, Korea, and the United States.
Int. J. Hum. Robot. 5, 25–46. doi:
10.1142/S0219843608001297
Nowicki, S., and Carton, J. (1993).
The measurement of emotional
intensity from facial expressions.
J. Soc. Psychol. 133, 749–750. doi:
10.1080/00224545.1993.9713934
Pelphrey, K. A., and Carter, E. J.
(2008). Brain mechanisms for
social perception. Ann. N.Y.
Acad. Sci. 1145, 283–299. doi:
10.1196/annals.1416.007
Pelphrey, K. A., Viola, R. J., and
McCarthy, G. (2004). When
strangers pass processing of
mutual and averted social gaze
in the superior temporal sulcus.
Psychol. Sci. 15, 598–603. doi:
10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00726.x
Perner, J., Frith, U., Leslie, A. M., and
Leekam, S. R. (1989). Exploration of
the autistic child’s theory of mind:
knowledge, belief, and communica-
tion. Child Dev. 60, 689–700. doi:
10.2307/1130734
Perner, J., and Wimmer, H. (1985).
“John thinks that Mary thinks
that. . .”: attribution of second-
order beliefs by 5- to 10-year-old
children. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 39,
437–471. doi: 10.1016/0022-0965
(85)90051-7
Ponkanen, L. M., Alhoniemi, A.,
Leppanen, J. M., and Hietanen, J. K.
(2010). Does it make a difference if I
have an eye contact with you or with
your picture? An ERP study. Soc.
Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 6, 486–494.
doi: 10.1093/scan/nsq068
Premack, D., and Woodruff, G.
(1978). Does the chimpanzee
have a theory of mind? Behav.
Brain Sci. 1, 515–526. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X00076512
Ramnani, N., and Miall, R. C. (2004).
A system in the human brain
for predicting the actions of oth-
ers. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 85–90. doi:
10.1038/nn1168
Risko, E. F., Laidlaw, K. E. W., Freeth,
M., Foulsham, T., and Kingstone,
A. (2012). Social attention with
real versus reel stimuli: toward
an empirical approach to con-
cerns about ecological validity.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:143. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2012.00143
Sarfati, Y., Hardy-Bayle, M.-C., Besche,
C., and Widlocher, D. (1997).
Attribution of intentions to others
in people with schizophrenia:
a non-verbal exploration with
comic strips. Schizophr. Res. 25,
199–209. doi: 10.1016/s0920-9964
(97)00025-x
Scassellati, B. (2002). Theory of
mind for a humanoid robot.
Auton. Robots 12, 13–24. doi:
10.1023/A:1013298507114
Scherer, K. R., and Scherer, U. (2011).
Assessing the ability to recognize
facial and vocal expressions of
emotion: construction and valida-
tion of the Emotion Recognition
Index. J. Nonverbal Behav. 35,
305–326. doi: 10.1007/s10919-
011-0115-4
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy,
V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht,
T., et al. (2012). Toward a second-
person neuroscience. Behav. Brain
Sci. (in press).
Scott, R. M., He, Z., Baillargeon,
R., and Cummins, D. (2012).
False-belief understanding in
2.5-year-olds: evidence from two
novel verbal spontaneous-response
tasks. Dev. Sci. 15, 181–193. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01103.x
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., and
Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action:
bodies and minds moving together.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 70–76. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.009
Sparks, A., McDonald, S., Lino, B.,
O’Donnell, M., and Green, M.
J. (2010). Social cognition, empa-
thy and functional outcome in
schizophrenia. Schizophr. Res. 122,
172–178. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2010.
06.011
Spell, L. A., and Frank, E. (2000).
Recognition of nonverbal
communication of affect fol-
lowing traumatic brain injury.
J. Nonverbal Behav. 24, 285–300.
doi: 10.1023/A:1006675230193
Staudte, M., and Crocker, M. (2009).
“The effect of robot gaze on
processing robot utterances,” in
Proceedings of the 31th Annual
Conference of the Cognitive Science
Society (Amsterdam).
Staudte, M., and Crocker, M. (2011).
Investigating joint attention
mechanisms through spo-
ken human robot interaction.
Cognition 120, 268–291. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2011.05.005
Thomas, L. A., De Bellis, M. D.,
Graham, R., and LaBar, K. S.
(2007). Development of emotional
facial recognition in late child-
hood and adolescence. Dev. Sci.
10, 547–558. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2007.00614.x
Tonks, J., Williams, W. H., Frampton,
I., Yates, P., and Slater, A. (2007).
Reading emotions after child
brain injury: a comparison
between children with brain
injury and non-injured con-
trols. Brain Inj. 21, 731–739. doi:
10.1080/02699050701426899
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 413 | 11
Byom and Mutlu New directions in ToM
Trafton, J. G., Cassimatis, N. L.,
Bugajska, M. D., Brock, D. P., Mintz,
F. E., and Schultz, A. C. (2005).
Enabling effective human-robot
interaction using perspective-
taking in robots. IEEE Trans. Syst.
Man Cybern. A Syst. Hum. 35,
460–470. doi: 10.1109/TSMCA.
2005.850592
Turkstra, L. S. (2008). Conversation-
based assessment of social cogni-
tion in adults with traumatic brain
injury. Brain Inj. 22, 397–409. doi:
10.1080/02699050802027059
Turkstra, L. S., Dixon, T. M., and
Baker, K. K. (2004). Theory of
Mind and social beliefs in adoles-
cents with traumatic brain injury.
Neurorehabilitation 19, 245–256.
Walters, M. L., Syrdal, D. S.,
Dautenhahn, K., Te Boekhorst,
R., and Koay, K. L. (2008). Avoiding
the uncanny valley: robot appear-
ance, personality and consistency
of behavior in an attention-seeking
home scenario for a robot compan-
ion. Auton. Robots 24, 159–178. doi:
10.1007/s10514-007-9058-3
White, S., Hill, E., Happe, F., and
Frith, U. (2009). Revisiting the
strange stories: revealing mentaliz-
ing impairments in autism. Child
Dev. 80, 1097–1117. doi: 10.1111/j.
1467-8624.2009.01319.x
Williams, J. A., Burns, E. L., and
Harmon, E. A. (2009). Insincere
utterances and gaze: eye contact
during sarcastic statements. Percept.
Mot. Skills 108, 565–572. doi:
10.2466/pms.108.2.565-572
Wilms, M., Schilbach, L., Pfeiffer, U.,
Bente, G., Fink, G. R., and Vogeley,
K. (2010). It’s in your eyes—using
gaze-contingent stimuli to create
truly interactive paradigms for
social cognitive and affective neuro-
science. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci.
5, 98–107. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsq024
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of
embodied cognition. Psychon. Bull.
Rev. 9, 625–636. doi: 10.3758/
BF03196322
Wimmer, H., and Perner, J. (1983).
Beliefs about beliefs: representation
and constraining function of wrong
beliefs in young children’s under-
standing of deception. Cognition
13, 103–128. doi: 10.1016/0010-
0277(83)90004-5
Zupan, B., Neumann, D., Babbage,
D. R., and Willer, B. (2009).
The importance of vocal affect
to bimodal processing of emo-
tion: implications for individuals
with traumatic brain injury.
J. Commun. Disord. 42, 1–17. doi:
10.1016/j.jcomdis.2008.06.001
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 13 January 2013; accepted: 11
July 2013; published online: 08 August
2013.
Citation: Byom LJ and Mutlu B (2013)
Theory of mind: mechanisms, meth-
ods, and new directions. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 7:413. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.
2013.00413
Copyright © 2013 Byom and Mutlu.
This is an open-access article dis-
tributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction
in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publica-
tion in this journal is cited, in accor-
dance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with
these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 413 | 12
